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mobile, which has in great measure supplanted the old horse-dxawn
carriage, . . It is therefore patent that the contracting parties
in the instant case, at the time of the execution of the contract,
intended to deprive the defendant of the right of performing any
service for the public which was an essential part of that performed
by one engaged in the livery business, and the fact that such service
was performed in a different manner from the way it was formerly
done will not excuse the defendant in violating the very purpose
and object intended by the contract."
No particular form is required for these covenants. Thus, the mere
memorandum, given in connection with the sale of a marble shop, in
these words, "This is to certify that I will not open up a marble shop
in the city of Murray in three years," and signed by the seller, was held
sufficient.' Neither is it essential that the covenant be In writing, if it
is possible that it may be completed within one year, as when the con-
tract is not to engage in business so long as one of the parties remains
in business.'
No cage involving covenants not to compete has arisen in Kentucky
in which the rights of either party to envoke the particular remedy
asked for has been questioned. In some cases the plaintiff has sought
damages for breach of the contract, In others he has asked for an
injunction restraining defendant from breaching the contract, but in
the majority of the cases, plaintiff has sought both damages and an
injunction, which, of course, is permissible under our code procedure,
and too well established to permit of questioning.
MAURUrM SHARP
OIL AND GAS-COMPARISON OF RESULTS UNDER OWNERSHIP
AND NON-OWNERSHIP VIEWS
The law of oil and gas is an exclusive subdivision of property law.
Because of its fugacious nature it has been likened to animals
ferae naturae; but this is not absolutely correct if for no other reason
than that animals ferae naturae are owned by the State, until a person
brings them Into possession, while oil and gas are not owned by the
State. Another analogy has been advanced stating that oil and gas
should be governed by the law of percolating waters. This Is errone-
Qus, because the owner of the land cannot use the water for commercial
14 Skaggs v. Simpson, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 410, 110 S.W. 251 (1908).
2 Dickey v. Dickinson, iLO5 Ky. 751, 49 S.W. 761 (1899) (A contract
not to again engage in, the newspaper business in the town of Glasgow
is possible of performance within a year by the death of the obligor
within that time, and not within the statute of frauds); Nickell v.
Johnson, 162 Ky. 520, 172 S.W. 938 (1915).
2In Ohio Oil Co. v Ind., 177 U.S. 190 (1900), the Supreme Court
recognizes the fallacy in the analogy of oil and gas and wild animals,
and says that although they are similar they are not identical. See
Roberts, Right of a State to Restrict Exportation of Naural Resources
(1936) 24 Ky. L. J. 259, 266.
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purposes if, in so doing, he defeats the use of other riparian owners,
while in oil and gas he can.' Yet oil and gas are property and are
definitely of pecuniary value to the persons who have the right to them.
In order to determine to whom this right belongs, some states have said
that the owner of the land is vested with an absolute fee in the oil and
gas beneath the surface; others have adopted the non-ownership view
which is, to put it vaguely, something short of ownership. The precise
inquiries of this paper are those of determining the different results
reached under the two doctrines. What is the proper view, and. what is
the position of Kentucky?
Kentucky has been classified as a non-ownership state2  If this Is
correct, then a lessee of an oil and gas lease cannot obtain title to the
oil and gas In place in this state, because the lessor did not have title
to it. Under the ownership view, the aessee may obtain absolute own-
ership to oil and gas. Yet it Is admitted, even in the states most strict-
ly following the ownership view, that the lessee may have "title" to the
oil and gas at the time of the execution of the lease, and then lose the
oil and gas when a neighbor legitimately withdraws them by pump,
or what have you, which is on his own land,' It is submitted, there-
fore, that since a person may legally take oil and gas from another,
who has "title" thereto, against his will, the ownership view tears out
the very heart of one of the fundamental laws of property; namely, the
right of one to retain his property without interference from the out-
side, except, of course, by the State under its powers of eminent domain
and police power." Notwithstanding this, it might be argued that this
is the simplest, and perhaps the only, way to reach practical results.
The validity of this argument will be tested subsequently.
It seems to be well settled, under either view, that oil and gas are
minerals and a part of the real estate in which they are found, and
possess the incidents of real estate. It follows from this that the land-
' See Note (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 602; Summers, Property in Oil
and Gas (1920) 9 Ky. L. J. 2
3 See Hobson, Ownership of Oil and Gas in Place (1924) 13 Ky.
L. J. 153.
' In Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. Dewitt, 130 Pa. 241,
18 A. 724 (1889), the court says, "Possession of land, therefore, is not
necessarily possession of the gas. If an adjoining, or distant, owner,
drills on his land, and taps your gas, so that it comes into his well
and under his control, it is no longer yours, but his".
Summers, supra note 2, at 8.
'See Ewart v. Robinson, 289 Fed. 740 (1923), where the court
says, "While the lease did not amount to a conveyance of the oil and
gas, or mineral In the ground, it did amount to a conveyance of an
Interest In the land, and was not a mere license". See also Lovelace v.
Southwestern Pet. Co., 267 Fed. 504 (1919); Kash v. United. Star Oil Co.,
192 Ky. 422 (1921); Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, 21Q Ky. 143, 292
S.W. 743 (1927); Swiss Oil Co. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 6Q S.W, (2d)
1037 (1934); Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Wiedeman Oil Co., 211 Ky. 382,
277 S.W. 323 (1925). Beckett-Iseman Oil Co. v. Backer, 165 Ky. 818,
178 S.W. 1084 (1915), "It is well settled that oil and gas are minerals
and a part of the realty, and a lease giving to the lessee the gas is a
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owner has a real interest in the oil and gas beneath the surface. Under
the doctrine of ownership, the interest amounts to absolute title, or title
with a condition subsequent. Under the non-ownership doctrine, the
interest has been classified as that of an irrevocable license, a profit a
prendre a present vested interest in land, or one of many other phrases.
It is submitted that the third mentioned, that is, a present vested
interest in land, handles the situations that arise more reasonably than
any of the other non-ownership classifications, and is more consistent
with settled rules of property law than is the ownership doctrine.
This is the rule expressed in Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild,7 where
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky says that although the landowner
does not own a "specific cubic foot of water, oil or gas under the
earth", yet he has the right to reduce them to possession, which is
"an interest in the land springing out of his ownership of everything
above and below the surface." It is anticipated at this point that, if
this is the correct interpretation of the non-ownership view, sub-
stantially the same results may be reached whether it is followed, or
whether the ownership view is followed.
It will be helpful to look at the Kentucky cases to find out how a
court has handled the problem over a number of years. When writers
say Kentucky is a non-ownership state,8 they invariably cite Louisville
Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating CoY and Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky
Heating Go." Undoubtedly the court did, by these decisions, lay down
the non-ownership view. In the latter case, the court says, "The right
of the surface owners to take gas from subjacent fields or reservoirs
is a right in common. There is no property in gas until it is taken."
In 1919, the Kentucky Court made an about face in its decision of
Scott v. Laws." There the instrument conveyed "all of the mineral
rights and coal privileges .. . . also the right to search for all undis-
covered minerals and coals upon the lands . . ." The court ends its
opinion by saying, "we conclude that the title to oil and gas necessarily
passed by the conveyance." It cannot be denied that the language of
contract for the transfer and sale of interests in lands and is required
to be in writing." See Willis, Kentucky Law of Oil and Gas (1924) 13
Ky. L. J. 3, "The legal status of oil and gas, debated for many years,
is now established. They are minerals, and a part of the real estate
in which they are found, and possess all the incidents of real estate".
See also Lewis, Is a Lease for Oil and Gas Mining Purposes for a Term
of Years Realty or Personalty? (1932) 21 Ky. L. J. 188.
7219 Ky. 143, 292 S.W. (2d) 1037 (1934). This is substantially the
same position taken by Judge Cochran in Lindlay v. Raydure, 239 Fed.
928 (1917), a case arising in Kentucky, when he says, "That an estate
in the surface of the land of some character vests in the lessee imme-
diately upon the execution of the instrument I do not understand to
be questioned anywhere".
'Summers, Oil and Gas (1927) 185.
'117 Ky. 71, 77 S.W. 368 (1903), "While natural gas is not subject
to absolute ownership, the owner of the soil must, in dealing with it,
use his property with due regard to the rights of his neighbor".
10132 Ky. 35, 111 S.W. 374 (1908). -
"185 Ky. 440, 215 S.W. 81 (1919).
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the case is inconsistent with the non-ownership view.P It should be
noted, however, that there is not a single case cited for the proposition
that oil and gas in place are subject to ownership. In an attempt to
show that it was the clear intentions of the parties that a perpetual
and exclusive right to all the minerals should pass to the purchaser,
"thereby investing him with title," the court cites four cases. Two of
the cases"' were decided in Pennyslvania, where the ownership doc-
trine, or at least a variation of it, governs. The only Kentucky case
cited"' is one where the exact problem involved was a stone quarry.
True, the instrument attempted to pass "all minerals," yet when the
court said that title passed, it amounted to mere dictum so far as oil
and gas are concerned. The last case cited is a South Carolina case,1
and has little weight in supporting the court's decision because the
subject matter involved in the case was phosphate, a non-fugacious
substance.
From this time on, the Kentucky Court has unpredictably swung
from one view to another. In Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural
Gas Co.,16 the court says that Kentucky follows Pennsylvania, and that
the owner of land owns oil and gas in the same manner and to the
same extent as an owner of solid minerals, subject, of course, to loss
through escape. In accort with this, and cited in the Hammonds
Case, is Trimble v. Kentucky River Coal Corp in which the court
says that Kentucky adopts the "corporeal rule," meaning that the pur-
chaser of oil and gas and other minerals, obtains ownership of the
substances. Only two months preceding the decision of the Ham-
monds Case, the court, in Swiss Oil Co. v. Hupp,28 said that the leasing
of coal is a conveyance of absolute title thereto, and is different from
that of oil and gas in that in the latter, the right of the lessee is "limited
to exploring and producing, and he does not acquire any title to the
oil and gas until it has been taken from the ground." The court cites
Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, supra, in which is found the state-
ment that landowner "does not own a specific cubic foot of water, oil,
or gas under the earth until he reduces it to possession."
In brief reiteration, up to the decision of Scott v. Laws, 1919, Ken-
tucky consistently adhered to the non-ownership view. It should be
recalled that the court, in its opinion in Scott v. Laws, failed to cite a
1 Kulp, Cases on Oil and Gas (1924) 33, "The 'absolute ownership'
theory recognized by Kentucky in Scott v. Laws, supra, has also been
accepted by Texas as one of its chief exponents". But see Summers,
Oil and Gas (1927) 134, "But the court did not decide in this case
(Scott v. Laws), as one writer seems to think (referring to Kulp),
that the grantee became owner of the oil and gas in place".
13Caldwell v. Copeland, 37 Pa. St. 427, 78 Am. Dec. 436 (1860);
Sanderson v. The City, 105 Pa. St. 469 (1884).
, Kennedy v. Hicks, 180 Ky. 562, 203 S.W. 318 (1918).
1 Massot v. Moses, 3 S.C. 168 (1871).
"6255 Ky. 685, 75 S.W. (2d) 204 (1934).
17235 Ky. 301, 31 S.W. (2d) 367 (1930).
" 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W. (2d) 1037 (1934).
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tingle Kentucky case supporting the ownership view, concerning oil
and gas. Cases which follow are inharmonious, to say the least, and
it cannot be said, with certainty, that the trend is toward either the
ownership or the non-ownership view.
What brought on the abrogation of the non-ownership view by the
Kentucky Court in Scott v. Laws? It might be suggested that justice
demanded that the court subscribe to the doctrine that the title to the
oil and gas passed to the lessee, the argument being that by the terms
of the instrument itself, such was intended. It is one thing for a court
to attempt to deliver justice in a virgin subject-matter, and quite an-
other to deliver it by turning its back on former decisions; especially
when to do such admits that oil and gas in place are subject to owner-
ship, which as insisted above, may result in violation of a fundamental
property law, in view of their fugacious nature. Aside from this, the
same result could have been obtained by following the non-ownership
view, as shown in Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, supra. In both
cases the instrument conveyed all of the mineral rights and privileges.
It was contended in Scott v. Laws, as in the Gray-Mellon Case, that the
rights had been lost by nonuser and abandonment, and the court, in
the latter case, states that Scott v. Laws "is the well-settled rule In
this state," but later says that the "owner in fee does not own a specific
cubic foot of water, oil or gas under the earth until he reduces It to
possession." Later, "But the right to reduce them to possession, if
found, is a valuable part of his property. It is an interest in the land
springing out of his ownership of everything above and below surface."
It is submitted that the situation involved in the Hammonds
Case, cited supra as an ownership case, could have been handled,
reaching the same result, under the non-ownership view. In that case
the gas company brought vast quantities of gas from distant fields and
put it through its previously drilled wells into the vacated underground
reservoir. Some of the gas went under appellant's land, and she sued
to recover for use and occupation on the ground of trespass. Judg-
ment went for tbe gas company, the court saying that the gas company
lost title to the gas when it went under appellant's land. This is far
from being inconsistent with the non-ownership doctrine, under which
it could be said that when the gas company forced the gas into the
ground, it thereafter had an exclusive right to retake all the gas that
it could extract, and that appellant had the same right on her land.
Appellant could not sue in trespass for use and occupation, because
the gas no longer belonged to the gas company. In other words, under
both views, the gas company lost its ownership of the gas when it
was again put in the ground.
In Trimble v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., cited above as support-
ing the ownership view, A bought coal, minerals, oils and gases
underlying certain property. He sold part of what he had purchased.
After his death the question arose as to whether the widow was
entitled to dower. The court seems to assume that in order to allow
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dower, A must have been vested with the fee in a corporeal thing real.
This is erroneous, as exprssed by Tiffany when he makes the follow-
Ing statement:1 0 "Since there Is a right of dower in lands and tene-
ments, and this latter term is regarded as inclusive of incorporeal
things real, it may exist in what we designate as 'rights to the use and
profits of another's land."' So, under the non-ownership view, even
if it Is interpreted as meaning nothing more than a right to go on and
search for and extract oil and gas, the widow would be entitled to
dower. Then certainly, under the proper interpretation, that there Is
prsent vested interest in land, she would be entitled to dower.
In the cases thus far discussed, it is urged that the same result
could be had regardless of which view is taken. Two other situations
will be briefly discussed. They are (1) Waste and (2) ejectment.
(1) Waste. It is also submitted that under either view, waste
might be prevented by a statute passed under the police power." Ken-
tucky has such a statute, and in this state it has consistently been
held that one may make reasonable use of oil and gas under his land,21
but may be enjoined from wasting themY In Louisville Gas Co. v.
Kentucky Heating Co., supra, it is said that each operator will not be
allowed to waste the common supply, and that independent of statutory
regulation the court will enjoin such waste. At this time Kentucky
was committeed to the Indian view that neighboring landowners had
a communal interest in the oil and gas under their lands, but this
conception is not a necessary attribute of the non-ownership dictrine.Y
The problem, then, is whether or not there is sufficient public interest
involved to support a statute preventing waste, so as not to contravene
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If there is such
public interest under the non-ownership view, then there is bound to
be under the ownership, and vice versa.
(2) Ejectment. No Kentucky cases are available on this sub-
ject, so it will be necessary to look to other jurisdictions for light.
Under an ordinary lease to blackaere, the lessee under the common Jaw,
11 Tiffany, Outlines of Real Property (1929) 186.
11 Digest of statutes of Ark., Crawford and Moses (1921) ch. 121,
part F, section 7309; Burns' Annotated In. Stat. (1926), sections 3016
and 3017; Revised Statutes of Kansas (1923) sections 55-103; Page's
Annotated General Code of Ohio (1926) section 6317; Compiled Statutes
of Oklahoma, Annotated (1921) ch. 68, section 7966; Vernon's Ann.
Civ. St. Tex. (1925) tit. 102, art. 6006.
21 Calor Oil and Gas Co. v. Franzell, 128 Ky. 715, 109 S.W. 328
(1908).
11 In Commonwealth v. Trent, 117 Ky. 34, 77 S.W. 390 (1903),
the court upheld Acts 1891-93, pp. 60, 61 (Kentucky Statutes, sections
3910-3914) when it prevented the wasting of gas as prohibited by the
acts. The court said it was within the police power to pass the act, as
a protection of the natural resources of the state. See also Calor Oil
and Gas Co. v. McGehee, 117 Ky. 71, 77 S.W. 368 (1903).
2 According to Veasey, The Law of Oil and Gas (1920) 18 Mich.
L. Rev. 445, 467, Kentucky and Indiana are the only states which
have adopted the common ownership view.
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had an interesse termini before entry and could not maintain eject-
ment. The lease was considered more in the nature of personalty.
On the other hand, as has already been urged, an oil and gas lease
passes, not a personal, but a real, interest. Judge Cochran, in a much
discussed opinion,2N says that the instrument is more in the nature of
a deed than a lease, and thus the lessee should bring an action for
waste or ejectment, rather than for specific performance. Where the
lessee has taken possession, there is little authority opposing the
view that the lessee may maintain ejectment. Where the plaintiff
has not entered the cases are not in harmony.2 Pennsylvania has
handled the situation by looking at the granting clause in the lease.
In the case of BarnsffaZl v. Bradford Gas Co.,2 where the instrument
demised, leased, and let land for purpose of mining and operating for
minerals, the court said that an interest in land, a corporeal heredita-
ment, passed, and thus the lessee may maintain ejectment though not
in possession. In Funk v. Haldeman," the lease granted the right to
merely explore for oil. The court reluctantly called the interest which
passed, an incorporeal hereditament, and thus concluded that eject-
ment would not lie. Where there is a lease containing this type of
granting clause the Pennsylvania Court has steadfastly adhered to the
doctrine of that case.0 Some of the states, including Kentucky, have
failed to distinguish the kinds of interests that pass under the two
types of leases5 In Scott v. Laws, the instrument conveyed "all of
the mineral right and coal privileges, also the right to search for all
undiscovered minerals and coals upon the lands . .." The court
adopted the ownership view and construed this clause to mean that
a fee was passed to the lessee. In Wolfe Co. v. Beckett, where the
instrument gave appellees the right to drill and operate for oil and
gas, the court says, "We conclude, therefore, that the form of the con-
24 Linlay v. Raydure, supra n. 7.
2In Karns v. Tanner, 66 Pa. 297, 5 M. Min. Rep. 289 (1870), it was
held that a lessee of oil and mineral rights and privileges, who had
been ousted, might recover in ejectment whether the right conferred
by the lease was corporeal or incorporeal. Accord: Bartley v. Phillips,
179 Pa. 175, 36 A. 217 (1897); and Chandler v. Hart, 161 Cal. 405, 119
Pac. 516 (1911).
-See 35 A.L.R. 237-241 (1925).
See Veasey, The Law of Oil and Gas (1920) 18 Mich. L. Rev. 749.
21225 Pa. 338, 74 A. 207 (1909).
" 53 Pa. St. 229 (1866).
'0See Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. 164 (1867); and Kelly v. Keys,
213 Pa. 295, 62 A. 911 (1906).
SSee Lindlay v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928 (1917); Kansas Court
held in Dickey v. Coffeeville Brick Co., 69 Kan. 106, 76 Pac. 398 (1904),
that an oil and gas lease creates an incorporeal hereditament or license,
regardless of the character of the lease presented. New York Court
of Appeals, in Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N.Y. 501, 62 N.E. 584 (1902),
holds that a "grant, demise and let" lease creates an incorporeal heredi-
tament, citing Funk v. Haldeman, failing to observe a distinction
between the two forms of lease.
-127 Ky. 252, 105 S.W. 447 (1907).
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tract is immaterial, and that it makes no difference whether the oil or
gas privileges be conveyed by deed or lease, just so the effect of the
instrument is to vest in the lessee all property rights to the oil or gas
that may be found in paying quantities." Under this view of the court,
the lessee takes the same interest whether the instrument purports
to pass a mere right to drill and explore for oil and gas, or to lease
land for purpose of obtaining oil and gas, or even to pass title to oil
and gas themselves.
It Is submitted, after a comparison of these cases, that whether
the different types of clauses cause a different result or not depends
upon the interpretation given them by a court, rather than an adher-
ence to either the ownership or non-ownership view. If the lease
merely provides for the privilege or right to explore for oil and gas,
the interest could be said to be an incorporeal hereditament under
the non-ownership view as well as under the ownership view, and eject-
ment probably would not lie where the lessee has not taken possession.
If it Is one which demises the land for the purpose of obtaining oil and
gas, the interest conveyed is a corporeal interest under the non-owner-
ship view where there is a present vested interest, as well as under the
other view where there is a fee simple interest; and ejectment should
lie in the one case as well as in the other.3
CONCLUsIoN
There can be no doubt that the Kentucky cases are inconsistent.
The writer has received the impression, from a review of Kentucky
decisions, that the Court of Appeals, in adopting the non-ownership
doctrine in the early cases, realized that to say oil and gas in place
are subject to ownership would necessarily force it to say that an
adjoining landowner could take private property from under the nose
of another, who owns it, without this other person being able to take
legal steps to prevent it. But later, situations arose in which the
court felt that in order to reach the most practical results, it must
adopt the ownersbip view, which it did on various occasions.
There has been an attempt, in this paper, to show that the owner-
ship doctrine is fundamentally wrong, and further, that the various
situations could be adequately handled with the non-ownership doctrine.
W. MAJOR GARDNER
3 In Ewart v. Robinson, 289 Fed. 740 (1923), it was held that
though a lease for a term of years, granting to the lessee the right to
prospect for the oil, gas, and mineral ores contained in the premises,
with a right to remove the same, did not convey the oil or gas minerals
in the ground, yet it was more than a mere license or incorporeal
hereditament, and vested in the lessee a present interest in the
premises, and the lessee could maintain ejectment, though he had
never had prior possession.
K. L. J.-9
